

Technical whitepaper

HP Sure Start

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1 Introduction

HP Sure Start Gen5 is a comprehensive firmware security and advanced firmware resilience solution to protect against firmware attacks and/or accidental corruption for the majority of boot critical system firmware—well beyond just protection of system BIOS. HP Sure Start can automatically detect, stop, and recover from attack or corruption without IT intervention and with little or no interruption to user productivity. Every time the PC powers on, HP Sure Start automatically validates the integrity of the firmware to help ensure that the PC is safeguarded from malicious attacks. Once the PC is operational, runtime intrusion detection constantly monitors memory. In the case of an attack, the PC can self-heal using an isolated “golden copy” of the firmware in minutes.

2 Why is BIOS protection important?

As our world becomes more connected, cyber-attacks are targeting client device firmware and hardware with increasing frequency and sophistication. Tools and techniques to attack firmware were once theoretical and thought only to be available to nation-states. Such tools and techniques have since been shown to not only exist, but to be readily available in the public domain.

The device firmware (or BIOS) is an attractive target for attackers because of the potential advantages a successful breach could provide:

- Persistence: Firmware resides in a nonvolatile memory on the circuit board and can't be removed simply by erasing the hard drive.
- Control: Firmware executes at the highest privilege level—outside of the OS domain—which enables the possibility of OS-independent malware.
- Stealth: Firmware occupies a region of memory that is completely inaccessible to the operating system and system software; since it can't be scanned by antivirus it may never be detected.
- Difficulty of recovery: All these aspects make it extremely difficult to recover from this type of infection without resorting to a service event that includes a system board replacement.

The ideal solution to protect devices against this type of attack is designed from the hardware up using “cyber resiliency” principles. These principles acknowledge that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to foresee and prevent every possible attack. The ideal solution not only provides enhanced protection of the firmware, but also includes a hardware rooted ability to both detect a successful attack and recover from it.

3 HP Sure Start provides superb firmware protection

HP Sure Start is HP's unique and groundbreaking approach to provide advanced firmware protection and resiliency to HP PCs. It uses hardware enforcement via the HP Endpoint Security Controller (HP ESC) to provide protection of the BIOS that reaches well beyond the industry standard and ensures that the system will only boot Genuine HP BIOS. Additionally, if HP Sure Start detects tampering with BIOS, firmware, or runtime System Management Mode (SMM) BIOS code, it can recover using a protected backup copy.

Summary of HP Sure Start features

- HP core platform firmware authenticity enforcement and tamper protection—HP Endpoint Security Controller hardware enforcement of the system boot, so only authentic and unmodified HP firmware and HP BIOS are loaded
- Firmware health monitoring and compliance—Logging of firmware health-related events via isolated HP Endpoint Security Controller; presents the platform firmware state along with any anomalies that could indicate thwarted attacks
- Self-healing—Automatic repair of HP BIOS and HP firmware corruption, using the HP Endpoint Security Controller isolated backup copy of HP BIOS and HP firmware
- BIOS setting protection—Extension of the HP Endpoint Security Controller protection of the BIOS code to include HP ESC backup and integrity-checking of all user or admin-configured BIOS settings
- Runtime Intrusion Detection—Ongoing monitoring of critical BIOS code in runtime memory (SMM) while the OS is running
- Secure boot keys protection—Significantly enhanced protection of databases and keys stored by the BIOS that are critical to the integrity of the OS secure boot feature versus standard UEFI BIOS implementation
- Protected storage—Strong cryptographic methods to store BIOS settings, user credentials, and other settings in the HP Endpoint Security Controller hardware to provide integrity protection, tamper detection, and confidentiality protection for that data
- Intel® Management Engine firmware protection—Full backup, integrity monitoring, and recovery services for Intel Management Engine firmware and critical data. Fully compliant with all NIST 800-193 resilience requirements.
- Manageability—Administrator management of HP Sure Start capabilities with the Manageability Integration Kit (MIK) plug-in for Microsoft® System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM)
- Direct Memory Access (DMA) Protection – Utilizes the I/O Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) to provide hardware protection against attacks to system memory via DMA capable devices. Also enables support for Microsoft “Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt™ 3” (Win10 RS4 and forward)

For a summary of capabilities added in each generation of HP Sure Start, see [Appendix A](#).

3.1 Third-party security certification

The HP Endpoint Security Controller hardware used in HP Sure Start has undergone third-party security assessment and has been certified to provide hardware enforcement so that only authorized firmware can start on the target PC.¹

Assurance that a security solution works as stated is a critical piece of any purchase decision related to security products. And because a reputation for quality can only go so far, HP has exposed the HP Endpoint Security Controller inner workings for review and testing by an independent and accredited laboratory to validate that it works as claimed per publicly available criteria, methodology, and processes.

¹ The HP Sure Start controller hardware has been certified per the CSPN certification framework.

3.2 Cyber-resilient design

Not only does HP Sure Start provide enhanced BIOS protection beyond the industry standard approach, but it is designed from the hardware up to provide unmatched platform cyber-resilience to ensure critical device firmware recovery even in the event of a breach or destructive attack.

All HP Sure Start Gen5 systems include the ability to recover from a completely erased system flash. The system flash contains the majority of the boot critical firmware elements that are required to boot the system and have reasonable functionality. Those boot critical elements include system BIOS, HP Endpoint Controller firmware, video BIOS, Intel Descriptor Region firmware, and Intel Management Engine firmware. If any one of these firmware elements in the system flash becomes corrupted in a manner that renders that subsystem non-functional, the system will be unable to boot. With an HP Sure Start Gen5 system, all these components are restored from the HP Sure Start private flash in order to ensure that the system does not become non-operational due to firmware attack or corruption.

HP business PCs with HP Sure Start exceed the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Platform Firmware Resiliency guidelines (Special Publication 800-193) for host processor boot firmware and other critical platform device firmware, as discussed in [Appendix C](#). NIST SP 800-193 is one of the leading public sector efforts to formalize requirements for cyber-resilient platforms. For more details about HP Sure Start and NIST 800-193, see [Appendix C](#).

3.3 HP Sure Start–supported models

HP introduced Sure Start in 2013. Since that time, HP has enhanced Sure Start and expanded the number of products that include it. HP Sure Start is provided across the entire 2019 Elite product lineup, including tablets, notebooks, desktops, and all-in-ones (AIOs). HP Sure Start Gen5 is available on HP Elite and HP Pro 600 products equipped with Intel® processors. Additionally, HP Sure Start for AMD is available on HP Elite 700 series products.

4 Architectural overview and capabilities

HP Sure Start consists of two major architectural components:

- HP Endpoint Security Controller running HP Sure Start firmware
- HP Sure Start BIOS working in conjunction with the HP Endpoint Security Controller hardware and firmware

4.1 Firmware integrity verification—the core of HP Sure Start

The HP Endpoint Security Controller (HP ESC) is the first device in the system to execute firmware when the system powers up, active well before the system boots. The HP ESC activities include, but are not limited to, monitoring the system power button and power sequencing the start of the host CPU execution when the user presses the power button.

When power is first applied to the platform (before the system is turned on), the HP ESC validates that its own firmware is authentic HP code before loading and executing the code. The HP ESC hardware uses industry-standard, strong cryptographic methods to perform the integrity verification. The method employs a 2048-bit HP RSA public key contained within internal permanent read-only memory. Therefore, the HP ESC is the built-in hardware-based Root of Trust (RoT) for the platform, used to validate its firmware and the HP BIOS before they are executed. This hardware Root of Trust protects against firmware replacement attacks regardless of their deployment method and serves as the foundation upon which HP platform security is built.




Figure 1 Firmware integrity verification process

Figure 1 illustrates the firmware integrity verification process. Once the HP ESC authenticates and starts executing the HP Sure Start firmware, that firmware uses the same strong cryptographic operations to verify the integrity of the system flash BIOS boot block. If a single bit is invalid, the HP ESC replaces the system flash contents with its own copy of the HP BIOS boot block that is stored within an isolated nonvolatile memory (NVM) dedicated to the HP ESC.

The HP Sure Start design ensures that all the firmware and BIOS code running on both the HP ESC and the host CPU is the code HP intended to be on the device.

Note: The system flash boot block integrity checking, and any needed recovery performed by the HP ESC, take place while the host CPU is off. Therefore, from a user point of view, the entire operation takes place when the system is still off, in sleep mode, or hibernate mode.

The system flash BIOS boot block is the foundation of the HP BIOS. The HP ESC hardware ensures that the BIOS boot block is the first code that the CPU executes after a reset. Once the HP ESC determines that the BIOS boot block contains authentic HP code, it allows the system to boot as it normally would.

The HP ESC also checks the integrity of the system flash boot block code each time the system is turned off or put into a hibernate or sleep mode. Since the CPU is powered off in each of these states and the CPU is therefore required to re-execute BIOS boot block code to resume, it is crucial to re-verify the integrity of the BIOS boot block each time to check for tampering.

Additionally, for HP Intel models, HP Sure Start checks the integrity of the system flash BIOS boot block every 15 minutes while the system is running².

4.2 Machine-unique data integrity

The HP ESC and BIOS work together to provide advanced protection of factory-configured critical variables unique to each machine that are intended to be constant over the life of any specific platform. In the factory, a backup copy of this variable data is saved in the HP ESC nonvolatile memory store. The backup is made available to the HP Sure Start BIOS component on a read-only basis to perform integrity checking of the data on every boot. If any setting in the shared flash is different from the factory settings, the HP Sure Start BIOS components will automatically restore the data in the System Flash from the backup copy provided by the HP ESC.

4.3 Descriptor region

For HP Intel models, HP Sure Start protects the descriptor region of the system flash. Unique to Intel architecture, the descriptor region contains critical configuration parameters that are sampled by the Intel Core™ logic at reset and used thereafter to configure the Core logic. The descriptor region also includes partitioning information for the system flash that is used by the Intel Core logic to determine where the BIOS region resides within the flash and therefore where their CPU retrieves code for execution from reset. HP Sure Start monitors the integrity of this region and recovers it to the intended configuration in the event of tampering or corruption.

4.4 Network controller protection

In addition, for HP Intel models, HP Sure Start protects the network controller (NIC) settings contained with the system flash. Some HP customers have use cases that require legitimate changes to factory configured NIC settings. Therefore, HP Sure Start does not prevent changes to NIC settings by default. Instead, HP Sure Start provides a feature that, when enabled, warns the user that NIC settings have changed. In addition, HP Sure Start provides a method to restore the NIC settings to factory values. Protected settings include the MAC address, the Pre-boot Execution Environment (PXE) settings, and the remote initial program load (RPL). This restoration is possible via a read-only backup copy protected by the HP ESC.

² HP Sure Start with Dynamic Protection is available on HP Elite products equipped with 6th generation Intel Core processors and higher.

4.5 BIOS setting protection

As previously described, HP Sure Start verifies the integrity and authenticity of the HP BIOS code. Since this code is static after it is created by HP, digital signatures can be used to confirm both attributes of the code. The dynamic and user-configurable nature of BIOS settings, however, create additional challenges to protecting those settings. Digital signatures cannot be generated by HP and used by the HP Sure Start ESC hardware to verify those settings.

HP Sure Start BIOS setting protection provides the capability to configure the system so the HP ESC hardware is used to back up and check the integrity of all the BIOS settings preferred by the user.

When this feature is enabled on the platform, all policy settings used by BIOS are subsequently backed up and an integrity check is performed on each boot to ensure that none of the BIOS policy settings have been modified. If a change is detected, the system uses the backup from the HP Sure Start-protected storage to automatically revert to the user-defined setting.

The HP Sure Start BIOS setting protection feature generates events to the HP Sure Start ESC hardware when an attempt to modify the BIOS settings is detected. The event is logged in the HP Sure Start audit log, and the local user will receive a notification from BIOS during boot.

4.6 HP Sure Start-protected storage

Protected storage rooted in the HP Endpoint Security Controller hardware provides the highest level of protection for BIOS/firmware data and settings protected by HP Sure Start. HP Sure Start-protected storage is designed to provide confidentiality, integrity, and tamper detection even if an attacker disassembles the system and establishes a direct connection to the nonvolatile storage device on the circuit board.

4.6.1 Data integrity

The integrity of the dynamic data stored in nonvolatile memory by firmware and used to control the state of various capabilities is critical to the security posture of the overall platform. Dynamic data includes all BIOS settings that can be modified by the end user or administrator of the device. Examples include (but are not limited to) boot options such as the secure boot feature, BIOS administrator password and related policies, Trusted Platform Module-state control, and HP Sure Start policy settings.

Any successful attack that bypasses the existing access restrictions designed to prevent unauthorized modifications to these settings could defeat the platform security. As an example, consider a scenario where an attacker makes an unauthorized modification to the secure boot state to disable it without being detected. In this scenario, the platform would boot the attacker's root kit before the OS starts, without the user's knowledge.

Industry-standard Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) BIOS does implement access restrictions that should prevent unauthorized modifications to these variables, and HP implements these just like the rest of the PC industry. However, given the risks a breach of these mechanisms poses to the platform, HP Sure Start provides secondary defenses that are stronger than the baseline industry standard.

BIOS settings and other dynamic data used by firmware to control the state that is protected by HP Sure Start are stored in the isolated nonvolatile memory of the HP Endpoint Security Controller that is not directly accessible to software running on the host CPU.

Additionally, the HP ESC creates and appends unique integrity measurements each time a data element is stored in this nonvolatile memory store. The integrity measurements are based on a strong cryptographic algorithm (hashed-based message authentication code utilizing SHA-256 hashing) that is rooted to a secret contained within the HP ESC. The secret is unique to each HP ESC, such that each controller generates a unique integrity measurement given an identical element. When the data element is read back from the nonvolatile memory, the HP ESC recalculates the integrity measurement for that data element and compares it to the integrity measurement that is appended to the data. Any unauthorized changes to the data in the nonvolatile memory store result in a mis-compare. Using this approach, the HP ESC can detect tampering with data elements stored in the nonvolatile memory store.

4.6.2 Data confidentiality

For many of the data elements stored by the platform, maintaining confidentiality is critical. Examples include BIOS administrator password hashes, user credentials, and secrets optionally stored by firmware on behalf of the user for firmware-based features such as HP Sure Run and HP Sure Recovery.

Protection of these secrets is challenging when industry-standard UEFI BIOS approaches are used, since the nonvolatile storage is typically readable by software running on the host processor. HP Sure Start-protected storage is intended to provide much greater protection of this confidential data than a standard UEFI BIOS implementation.

In addition to a separate isolated storage, HP Sure Start leverages the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) hardware block contained within the HP ESC to perform AES-256 encryption on all confidential data elements stored in the HP Sure Start nonvolatile memory, in addition to the data integrity measurements for those elements. The encryption key used is unique to each HP ESC and never leaves that controller, so data encrypted by any individual HP ESC component can only be decrypted by that same HP ESC.

4.7 Secure boot keys protection

Compared to the industry-standard UEFI secure boot implementation, HP Sure Start provides enhanced protection of the UEFI secure boot key databases that are stored by the firmware. These variables are critical to proper operation of the UEFI secure boot feature that verifies integrity and authenticity of the OS bootloader before allowing it to start at boot.

HP Sure Start protects UEFI secure boot key databases by maintaining a master copy in HP Sure Start-protected storage.

Any authorized modifications to the UEFI standard secure boot key databases by the OS during runtime are tracked by HP Sure Start and applied to the master copy by the HP ESC. HP Sure Start then uses the master copy in HP Sure Start-protected storage to identify and reject any unauthorized changes to the UEFI standard secure boot keys databases.

This capability, enabled by default, covers the following databases:

- Signature database (db)
- Revoked signatures database (dbx)
- Key Enrollment Key (KEK)
- Platform Key (PEK) updated dynamically at runtime by the OS

4.8 Runtime Intrusion Detection (RTID)

On each boot, the BIOS code starts execution from flash memory at a fixed address. This is known as the BIOS boot code and provides capabilities needed before the OS starts. However, a portion of BIOS remains in DRAM that is needed to provide advanced power-management features, OS services, and other OS-independent functions while the OS is running. This BIOS code, referred to as System Management Mode (SMM) code, resides in a special area within the DRAM that is hidden from the OS. We also refer to this code as “runtime” BIOS code in the context of HP Sure Start’s Runtime Intrusion Detection feature. (For more details on SMM and how it works, please see [Appendix B](#).)

The integrity of SMM code is critical to the client device security posture. HP Sure Start checks to make sure HP SMM BIOS code is intact at OS start. By adding new protection capabilities and/or providing a means to detect any attack to that code, Runtime Intrusion Detection provides mechanisms to ensure that the SMM BIOS code remains intact while the OS is running.




Figure 2 Runtime Intrusion Detection uses specialized hardware embedded within the platform chipset to monitor SMM code for any changes.

4.8.1 Runtime Intrusion Detection architecture

The RTID feature utilizes specialized hardware in the platform chipset to detect anomalies in the Runtime HP SMM BIOS. Detection of any anomalies results in a notification to the HP Endpoint Security Controller, which can take the configured policy action independent of the CPU.

4.9 Intel® Management Engine firmware protection

All HP Sure Start Gen5 systems include the ability to fully recover from corrupted Intel Management Engine firmware and/or critical data associated with the Intel Management Engine subsystem.

In those systems that include support for HP Sure Recover with Embedded Reimaging, HP Sure Start Gen5 is able to recover the entire Intel Management Firmware using a copy of Intel Management engine firmware stored on the Embedded Reimaging device on the system board with no additional dependencies.

On HP Sure Start Gen5 systems that do not support Embedded Reimaging, HP Sure Start uses a copy of the Intel Management firmware that is included on the system EFI partition on the primary mass storage device for full recovery. In the event that the Intel Management Engine firmware update has been removed from the EFI partition, HP Sure Start Gen5 will only perform a partial recovery of the Intel Management Engine firmware and/or critical data from the HP Sure Start private flash that will enable the system to operate with reasonable functionality. In order to fully restore all functionality provided the Intel Management Engine Firmware, it will be necessary to apply an update to the Intel Management Firmware Engine firmware which will restore the full recovery image to the EFI partition.

Customers that deploy their own OS images need to take some additional steps to ensure that HP Sure Start Gen5 can fully recover the Intel Management Engine Firmware with complete autonomy. Those steps include creating a system EFI partition that is at least 360MB, and applying an HP Intel Management Engine firmware update package.

5 User notifications, event logging, and policy management

5.1 HP Sure Start end user notifications

Under normal operating conditions, HP Sure Start is invisible to the user. When HP Sure Start identifies a problem, recovery operations are automatic, using the default settings with no end user or IT interaction usually required.

Users may see runtime notifications in the event of a BIOS integrity problem detected via the HP Sure Start Dynamic Protection or the Runtime Intrusion Detection features while the OS is running. If any significant event is detected or action is taken, HP Sure Start displays a warning message via Windows® notifications on the next boot. HP Notifications Software is required to enable the viewing of these Windows notifications.

5.2 HP Sure Start event logging

The HP Endpoint Security Controller records critical events related to the firmware/BIOS code and data monitored by HP Sure Start. These events are stored within the Sure Start nonvolatile memory store. When HP Notifications software is installed, the events are copied from the HP ESC to the Windows Event Viewer to facilitate access to these events by the local user as well as the customer's preferred manageability agent.

The following events trigger the HP Notifications Software to gather all events from the HP Sure Start subsystem and ensure that the Windows Event Viewer is updated with any events that are not already recorded there:

- Windows Boot
- Windows Resume from Sleep/Hibernate
- HP Sure Start with dynamic protection runtime event notifications
- HP Sure Start Runtime Intrusion Detection (RTID)

HP Notifications Software populates HP Sure Start events into a unique "HP Sure Start" application event log. Only HP Sure Start events will be included in this log. The Windows Event Viewer path to the HP Sure Start events is the following: System Tools/Event Viewer/Applications and Services Logs/HP Sure Start.

The Windows Event Viewer level categories related to HP Sure Start events are defined in [Table 1](#).

The events are populated into Windows Event Viewer in the order that they were generated by HP Sure Start. The oldest event in the HP Sure Start subsystem is added to the Windows Event Viewer first and the most recent event is added last.

The timestamp for each Windows Event Viewer entry is the time it was added to that log, NOT the time the event occurred. Each Sure Start Windows Event Viewer entry includes detailed data within the event details, which includes the timestamp of the actual occurrence.

Note: Events are persistent in the HP Endpoint Security Controller even after being copied to the Windows Event Viewer. If the Windows Event Viewer is cleared, the HP Notifications Software application will replace all HP Sure Start entries on the next event that triggers it to check for HP Sure Start event logs.

Table 1 Types of HP Sure Start Windows Event Viewer events

| Event Level | Definition |
|-------------|--|
| Info | Events that are expected to occur during the normal course of operation (e.g., updating the BIOS). |
| Warning | Unexpected events that have occurred but were fully recovered from by HP Sure Start and no user/admin action is required for the platform to be fully operational. These events are anomalous operations that the user/admin may want to investigate further, especially if there is a trend of these events across multiple machines. |
| Error | Events that require the admin/HP service to act on the platforms to fully recover. |

5.3 HP Sure Start policy controls

Out of the box, the HP system BIOS enables and optimizes HP Sure Start policies for the typical user. Since HP Sure Start is enabled by default, the typical user is protected by HP Sure Start without having to modify the settings. For advanced users, the system BIOS provides some control of HP Sure Start behavior, using policy settings in the (F10) BIOS Setup. Unless otherwise noted, these settings and functions are located under Security/BIOS Sure Start.

Note: Policies are stored within the HP ESC nonvolatile memory that is not directly accessible by the host CPU; therefore, a reboot is required before any Sure Start settings take effect.

The following HP Sure Start settings and functions are available:

- Verify Boot Block on Every Boot
- BIOS Data Recovery Policy
- Network Controller Configuration Restore (Intel only)
- Prompt on Network Controller Configuration Change (Intel only)
- Dynamic Runtime Scanning of Boot Block (Intel only)
- HP Sure Start BIOS Setting Protection
- HP Sure Start Secure Boot Keys Protection
- Enhanced HP Firmware Runtime Intrusion Prevention and Detection (Intel only)
- HP Firmware Runtime Intrusion Detection (AMD only)
- HP Sure Start Security Event Policy
- HP Sure Start Security Event Boot Notification
- Lock BIOS Version
- Save/Restore MBR of System Hard Drive
- Save/Restore GPT of System Hard Drive
- Boot Sector (MBR/GPT) Recovery Policy
- DMA Protection

5.3.1 Verify Boot Block on Every Boot

HP Sure Start always verifies the integrity of the system flash BIOS boot block before resuming from sleep, hibernate, or power-off. When set to enable, HP Sure Start will also verify the integrity of the boot block on each warm boot (Windows restart). The trade-off to consider is faster restart time versus more security. The default setting of this feature is set to "Disable".

5.3.2 BIOS Data Recovery Policy

When set to Automatic, HP Sure Start automatically repairs the BIOS or the Machine Unique Data when necessary. When set to Manual, HP Sure Start requires a special key sequence to proceed with the repair. In the case of an issue with the boot block code, the system will refuse to boot, and a unique blink sequence will flash on the system LED. The system LED that lights may vary by platform and by instance. In the case of an issue with the Machine Unique Data, the system will display a message on the screen. The key sequence required, and the blink sequence displayed, vary depending whether the system is a notebook, a desktop, or a tablet. Manual mode is useful to users who can perform forensics on the system flash contents before repair. Typical users are not encouraged to use manual mode. The default setting of this feature is set to “Automatic”.

5.3.3 Network Controller Configuration Restore (Intel only)

When selected, HP Sure Start immediately restores the network controller configuration to factory defaults.

5.3.4 Prompt on Network Controller Configuration Change (Intel only)

HP provides a factory-defined network controller configuration which includes the MAC address. When this setting is set to enable, the system monitors the state of the network controller configuration and prompts the user in the event of a change from the factory-configured state. The default setting of this feature is set to “Disable”.

5.3.5 Dynamic Runtime Scanning of Boot Block (Intel only)

When in the default setting of enable, HP Sure Start periodically checks the integrity of the BIOS boot block while the OS is running. When in the disable setting, HP Sure Start only checks the integrity before a boot or resume from sleep or hibernate.

5.3.6 HP Sure Start BIOS Setting Protection

The BIOS setting protection policy is disabled by default. To enable the feature, the owner/administrator of the client device should first configure all BIOS policies to the preferred setting. The owner/administrator also must configure a BIOS setup administrator password.

Once that is completed, the BIOS setting protection policy should be changed to “Enable.” At this point, a backup copy of all BIOS settings is created in the HP Sure Start-protected storage. Going forward, none of the BIOS settings can be modified locally or remotely. On each boot, the BIOS policy settings are verified to be in the desired state, and if there is any discrepancy, the BIOS settings are restored from the HP Sure Start-protected storage.

To modify a BIOS setting, the BIOS administrator password must be provided and BIOS setting protection subsequently disabled, at which point changes can be made to the BIOS settings.

5.3.7 HP Sure Start Secure Boot Keys Protection

With this setting at the factory default of enable, HP Sure Start provides enhanced protection of the secure boot databases and keys used by BIOS to verify the integrity and authenticity of the OS bootloader before launching it at boot. When set to “Disable”, only standard UEFI secure boot variable protection is used and no backup copy is kept by the HP Sure Start subsystem.

5.3.8 Enhanced HP Firmware Runtime Intrusion Prevention and Detection (Intel only) and HP Firmware Runtime Intrusion Detection (AMD only)

The RTID feature is enabled by default for all platforms shipped from the HP factory. There is no need for the end customer/administrator to enable or otherwise deploy the feature to take advantage of HP Sure Start RTID.

The RTID feature can be optionally be set to “Disable” by the platform owner/administrator.

5.3.9 HP Sure Start Security Event Policy

This BIOS policy setting controls what action is taken when HP Sure Start detects an attack or attempted attack while the OS is running. There are three possible configurations for this policy:

- Log event only: When this setting is selected, the HP ESC logs detection events, which can be viewed in the Applications and Services Logs/HP Sure Start path of the Microsoft Windows Event Viewer³.
- Log event and notify user: This is the default setting. When this setting is selected, the HP ESC logs detection events, which can be viewed in the Applications and Services Logs/HP Sure Start path of the Microsoft Windows Event Viewer.
- Additionally, the user is notified within Windows that the event occurred⁴.
- Log event and power off system: When this setting is selected, the HP ESC logs detection events, which can be viewed in the Applications and Services Logs/HP Sure Start path of the Microsoft Windows Event Viewer. Additionally, the user is notified within Windows that the event occurred, and that system shutdown is imminent.

5.3.10 HP Sure Start Security Event Boot Notification

This BIOS policy setting controls whether HP Sure Start warnings and error messages that are displayed when the system is booted require the local user to acknowledge the error before the boot continues. With the default Require Acknowledgement setting, the system halts with the error message displayed. The local user must press a key to continue the boot. If changed to Time out after 15 seconds, the message is displayed, but the boot process continues automatically after the message is displayed for 15 seconds.

5.3.11 Lock BIOS Version

In the (F10) BIOS setup, this feature is located in Main/Update System BIOS.

When set to “Disable”, you can update the BIOS using any supported process. When the HP ESC detects a valid boot block update in the system flash, it updates the backup copy of the boot block.

When set to “Enable”, all HP BIOS update tools refuse to update the BIOS. In addition, HP Sure Start protects the BIOS from attempts to change the BIOS version by removing the system flash via an unauthorized method. The HP ESC records the locked-down version of BIOS. When the HP ESC detects that the BIOS in the system flash changed, the HP ESC overwrites the BIOS boot block with the HP ESC copy of the boot block. The HP ESC copy of the boot block executes and recovers the remainder of the correct version of the BIOS. The default setting of this feature is “Disabled”.

³ HP Notification Software must be installed to view HP Sure Start events in the Windows Event Viewer.

⁴ HP Notification Software must be installed to receive notifications.

5.3.12 Save/Restore MBR of System Hard Drive and Save/Restore GPT of System Hard Drive

In the (F10) BIOS setup, this feature is located in Security/Hard Drive Utilities. Only one of these capabilities is available, depending on the partition type of the primary drive (GPT or MBR), as detected by HP Sure Start.

When set to “Enable”, HP Sure Start maintains a protected backup copy of the MBR/GPT partition table from the primary drive and compares the backup copy to the primary on each boot. If a difference is detected, the user is prompted and can choose to recover from the backup to the original state, or to update the protected backup copy with the changes. The Boot Sector (MBR/GPT) Recovery Policy can optionally be used to remove the user decision for the action taken in the event of a discrepancy found by HP Sure Start.

When set to “Disable” (default), no MBR/GPT protection is provided by HP Sure Start.

5.3.13 Boot Sector (MBR/GPT) Recovery Policy

When set to Local User Control (default) the user is prompted for the action to take when HP Sure Start detects a change in the MBR/GPT partition table. When set to Recover in the event of corruption, HP Sure Start automatically restores the MBR/GPT to the saved state any time differences are encountered.

5.3.14 DMA Protection

When set to “Enable” (default), HP firmware configures the IOMMU to block DMA (Direct Memory Access) by unknown peripheral devices in the BIOS pre-boot environment. The BIOS will also configure the system appropriately to enable Microsoft Kernel DMA protection for Thunderbolt 3 which takes over management of the IOMMU at OS start time to provide the same protections from DMA attacks in the OS environment.

5.4 Remote management of HP Sure Start policy controls

Out of the box, HP Sure Start policies are optimized for the typical user. Since HP Sure Start is enabled by default, there is no need for the remote administrator to take any action to enable (“deploy”) HP Sure Start. If a remote administrator wants to modify HP Sure Start policy settings, the same Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) APIs or HP BIOS Configuration Utility scripts that are used to manage other platform BIOS policies can be used to manage HP Sure Start policies. In addition, administrators can remotely manage HP Sure Start capabilities with the Manageability Integration Kit (MIK) plug-in for Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM).

Also, administrators can remotely manage HP Sure Start capabilities and view HP Sure Start events with the Manageability Integration Kit (MIK) plug-in for Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM).

6 Conclusion

HP Sure Start delivers these key benefits:

- Uninterrupted productivity—HP Sure Start maintains business continuity in the event of an attack or accidental corruption by eliminating downtime waiting for an IT/Service event.
- Lower cost—HP Sure Start's ability to recover automatically reduces calls to the IT Help Desk and enhances productivity, which ultimately helps lower the maintenance cost for the platform.
- Peace of mind—HP Sure Start has multiple security features that run across a wide variety of software and hardware platforms.

Protect critical BIOS firmware from malware with the industry-leading firmware intrusion detection and automatic repair offered by HP Sure Start, exclusively available on select HP Elite PCs.

Learn more

hp.com/go/computersecurity

Links to technical content

support.hp.com/us-en/topic/qoIT

7 Appendix A—HP Sure Start, Gen by Gen

HP introduced Sure Start in 2014. Since that time, HP has enhanced Sure Start and expanded the number of products that use it. The table below provides a summary of the capabilities that were added with each generation.

Table 2 Sure Start, Gen by Gen

| Generation | Release Date | Capabilities Added |
|---|--------------|---|
| HP Sure Start | 2013 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Firmware and BIOS authenticity enforcement, with the ability to self-heal Firmware monitoring and compliance |
| HP Sure Start with Dynamic Protection | 2015 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Windows Event Viewer support Dynamic Protection (for select Intel products) |
| HP Sure Start Gen3 (select Intel products) ⁵ | 2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Runtime Intrusion Detection BIOS setting protection Manageability Integration Kit (MIK) plug-in for Microsoft SCCM |
| HP Sure Start Gen4 ⁶ | 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protected storage—strong cryptographic methods to store BIOS settings, user credentials, and other settings in the HP Endpoint Security Controller hardware to provide integrity protection, tamper detection, and confidentiality protection for that data Secure boot database protection—enhanced protection of databases and keys stored by BIOS that are critical to the integrity of the OS secure boot feature versus standard UEFI BIOS implementation On Intel platforms, enhanced protection and recovery of the Intel Management Engine Firmware for any failures that occur across updates or failure of main Intel ME firmware Third-party security certification of HP Endpoint Security Controller—testing by an independent and accredited laboratory to validate that the HP ESC hardware core functionality works as claimed per publicly available criteria, methodology, and processes¹ HP business PCs with HP Sure Start exceed the NIST Platform Firmware Resiliency guidelines (Special Publication 800-193) for host processor boot firmware and other critical platform device firmware, as discussed in Appendix C. |
| HP Sure Start Gen5 ⁷ | 2019 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Full back-up, integrity monitoring, and recovery services for of Intel Manageability Engine firmware including main firmware and boot critical portions of code and data. DMA Protection |

⁵ HP Sure Start Gen3 is available on HP Elite products equipped with Intel 7th generation processors.

⁶ HP Sure Start Gen4 is available on HP Elite and HP Pro 600 products equipped with 8th generation Intel or AMD processors.

⁷ HP Sure Start Gen5 is available on select HP PCs with Intel processors. See product specifications for availability.

8 Appendix B—System Management Mode (SMM) overview

System Management Mode (SMM) is an industry-standard approach used for PC advanced power-management features and other OS-independent functions while the OS is running. While the SMM term and implementation is specific to x86 architectures, many modern computing architectures use a similar architectural concept.

SMM is configured by the BIOS at boot time. The SMM code is populated into the main (DRAM) memory. Then BIOS uses special (lockable) configuration registers within the chipset to block access to this area when the microprocessor is not executing in an SMM context. At runtime, entry into SMM mode is event-driven. The chipset is programmed to recognize many types of events and timeouts. When such an event occurs, the chipset hardware asserts the System Management Interrupt (SMI) input pin. At the next instruction boundary, the microprocessor saves its entire state and enters SMM.

As the microprocessor enters SMM, it asserts a hardware output pin, SMI Active (SMIACT). This pin serves notice to the chipset hardware that the microprocessor is entering SMM. An SMI can be asserted at any time, during any process operating mode, except from within SMM itself. The chipset hardware recognizes the SMIACT signal and redirects all subsequent memory cycles to a protected area of memory (sometimes referred to as the SMRAM area), reserved specifically for SMM. Immediately after receiving the SMI input and asserting the SMIACT output, the microprocessor begins to save its entire internal state to this protected memory area.

After the microprocessor state has been stored to SMRAM memory, the special SMM handler code that also resides in SMRAM (placed there by system BIOS at boot time) begins to execute in a special SMM operation mode. While operating in this mode, most hardware and memory isolation mechanisms are suspended, and the microprocessor can access virtually all resources in the platform to enable it to perform required tasks. The SMM code completes the required task, and then it's time to return the microprocessor to the previous operating mode. At that point, the SMM code executes the Return from System Management Mode (RSM) instruction to exit SMM. The RSM instruction causes the microprocessor to restore its previous internal state data from the copy saved in SMRAM upon SMM entry. Upon completion of RSM, the entire microprocessor state has been restored to the state just prior to the SMI event, and the previous program (OS, applications, hypervisor, etc.) resumes execution right where it left off.

9 Appendix C—NIST SP 800-193: Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines

Released in May 2018, the NIST SP 800-193: Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines describe guidelines for security mechanisms to protect platform firmware against unauthorized changes, detect unauthorized changes that occur, and recover from these unauthorized changes.

These guidelines outline three different resiliency properties:

1. Protected: meets all Protection and Secure Update requirements
2. Recoverable: meets all Detection and Recovery requirements
3. Resilient: meets all Protection, Detection, and Recovery requirements

Of these three properties, Resilient is the strongest, providing the most benefit to HP Customers.

[HP Sure Start Gen3, Gen4, and Gen5 meet and exceed all Resilient guidelines in NIST SP 800-193 for host processor boot firmware, also known as the UEFI BIOS.](#) Further, HP Sure Start Gen3, Gen4, and Gen5 progressively expand the number of other firmware based Critical Platform Device Firmware that are protected per NIST 800-193 requirements, as shown in [Table 3](#).

9.1 Prior NIST guidelines for BIOS security

NIST SP 800-193 goes beyond NIST SP 800-147, which only addressed protection and the secure update of the platform's UEFI BIOS. HP Sure Start Gen5 and prior generations of HP Sure Start, along with HP BIOSphere Gen5 and prior generations of HP BIOSphere, all support NIST SP 800-147.

NIST SP 800-193 also goes beyond NIST SP 800-155, which outlined security components and guidelines to establish a secure BIOS integrity measurement and reporting chain. Likewise, HP Sure Start Gen5 and prior generations of HP Sure Start, along with HP BIOSphere Gen5 and prior generations of HP BIOSphere, all support NIST SP 800-155.

9.2 NIST SP 800-193 Critical Platform Devices in HP Commercial PCs

NIST SP 800-193 acknowledges that the definition of Critical Platform Devices can vary. Critical Platform Devices are defined in section 3.2 (Resiliency Properties):

“For a platform as a whole to claim resiliency to destructive attacks, the set of platform devices necessary to minimally restore operation of the system, and sufficient to restore reasonable functionality, should themselves be resilient. We call this set of devices critical platform devices. The particular resiliency properties may vary from platform-to-platform.”

For that reason, it is important to define this set of devices and applicable firmware for HP Commercial PCs. NIST SP 800-193 provides a reference platform architecture in Section 2 along with a list of devices which are “often critical to the normal and secure operation of a platform.” The table below provides a mapping to each of those devices/subsystems to the applicable firmware components in the HP Commercial Notebook PCs.

Note that each customer environment should be evaluated to determine whether there are additional peripheral devices that are critical to restore reasonable functionality specific to the customer's deployment.

Table 3 Critical Platform Device Firmware Protected by HP Sure Start or other technology

| NIST SP 800-193 Platform Architecture Reference | HP Commercial PC critical platform device firmware | Protected by |
|---|---|------------------------------------|
| 1. Embedded Controller (EC)/Super I/O (SIO) 4. Host Processor 6. Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) when implemented as Unified Memory Architecture (UMA) 8. Host Controller (HC) for mass storage device 11. Host Processor Boot Firmware 12. Platform Runtime Firmware 13. Power Supply 15. Fans | HP ESC firmware HP UEFI BIOS firmware | HP Sure Start Gen3, Gen4, and Gen5 |
| 2. Trusted Platform Module (TPM) | Discrete TPM component firmware ¹ | TPM |
| 3. Baseboard Management Controller (BMC)/Management Engine (ME) | Intel Management Engine firmware AMD Secure Processor firmware | HP Sure Start Gen5 |
| 5. Network Interface Controller (NIC) | Intel integrated GbE NIC firmware ² | HP Sure Start Gen3, Gen4, and Gen5 |
| 7. Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Flash | Descriptor firmware | HP Sure Start Gen3, Gen4, and Gen5 |
| 9. Hard Disk Drive (HDD)/Solid State Drive (SSD) | HDD/SSD firmware ³ | |
| 10. Embedded MultiMediaCard (eMMC)/Universal Flash Storage (UFS) | N/A ⁴ | N/A ⁴ |
| 14. Glue Logic (CPLD's, FPGA's) | N/A ⁴ | N/A ⁴ |

¹ This component is not critical to boot of the platform.

² This component is not critical to minimally restore operation of the system but is required to establish Ethernet connectivity in environments where that connectivity is deemed critical to platform resiliency.

³ Mass storage devices are outside the scope of this document. Resiliency capabilities vary by storage supplier and by storage device. Not all suppliers or devices currently meet all Resiliency requirements in 800-193.

⁴ No devices of this type are included.

Acronyms

- BIOS – Basic Input/Output System (aka host processor boot firmware)
- CPU – Central processing unit
- ESC – HP Endpoint Security Controller
- Gen3+ – Applies to HP Sure Start Gen3, Gen4, and Gen5
- Gen4+ - Applies HP Sure Start Gen4, and Gen5
- Gen5 – Applies only to HP Sure Start Gen5
- HMAC – Hash-based message authentication code
- HW – Hardware
- OS – Operating system
- POST – Power-On Self-Test
- RoT – Root of Trust (defined in NIST SP 800-193)
- RTD – Root of Trust for Detection (defined in NIST SP 800-193)
- RTRec – Root of Trust for Recovery (defined in NIST SP 800-193)
- SMM – System Management Mode
- UEFI – Unified Extensible Firmware Interface

Table 4 Required functions for Host Processor Boot Firmware

The table below provides a summary of each function described by NIST SP 800-193.

| NIST SP 800-193 | HP Sure Start | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Roots of Trust (Section 4.1) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+ uses a hardware-based RoT (the HP ESC) with immutable boot firmware, which cryptographically verifies subsequent firmware before launching it, creating a Chain of Trust. • Gen3+ includes a key store and approved digital signing algorithms based on FIPS 186-4 to verify the digital signature of firmware update images. • Gen3+ uses authenticated update, detection, and recovery mechanisms, which are anchored in Gen3+'s HW-based RoT. |
| Protection and Update of Mutable Code (Section 4.2.1) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+ uses an authenticated update mechanism anchored in Gen3+'s HW-based RoT. • Firmware update images are digitally signed by HP's code signing service (HP Secure Sign) and verified by Gen3+ prior to updating. • Gen3+ integrity protects the HP ESC and UEFI flash regions, so that only its authenticated update mechanism or a secure local update through physical presence can modify those flash regions. • Gen3+ has no known authenticated update bypass mechanisms and contains the ability to prevent rollback to earlier authentic firmware images with known security vulnerabilities. |
| Protection of Immutable Code (Section 4.2.2) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+ uses a hardware-based RoT (the HP ESC) with immutable boot firmware. |
| Runtime Protection of Critical Platform FW (Section 4.2.3) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critical Platform Firmware executing in volatile storage (RAM) runs and: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – ceases its operation prior to the loading of system software. That is, it runs during POST and stops before the OS is loaded. – is protected from system software using SMM protections enforced by the CPU |
| Protection of Critical Data (Section 4.2.4) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen4+ Critical Data, such as Secure Boot authenticated variables, are only modifiable through defined APIs provided by device firmware. These APIs employ a mechanism to authenticate that the data is originating from an authorized source before applying the change. • Gen4+ Critical Data, such as per-platform unique factory configuration settings, are only modifiable through defined APIs provided by device firmware. These APIs employ a mechanism to authenticate that the request is originating from an authorized HP service provider before they allow the change. • Gen4+ Critical Data, such as BIOS settings that can be configured in the field, are only modifiable through defined APIs. These APIs are accessed only via a system administrator who has configured the BIOS administrator password. • Gen3+ factory default settings, which are not per-platform-specific, employ the same protection as the code. This includes integrity and authenticity verification via digital signature. These setting updates are controlled and protected in the same manner as the firmware. |

Table 4 continued

The table below provides a summary of each function described by NIST SP 800-193.

| NIST SP 800-193 | HP Sure Start | |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| Detection of Corrupted Code (Section 4.3.1) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A successful attack on the platform firmware will not impact Gen3+'s RTD. The RTD is maintained in a private flash area inaccessible to the system software that might compromise the platform firmware. • Firmware code is validated by Gen3+'s RTD using approved digital signature algorithms and cryptographic hashes. |
| Detection of Corrupted Critical Data (Section 4.3.2) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A successful attack on the Active Critical Data will not impact Gen3+'s RTD. The RTD is maintained in a private flash area inaccessible to the system software that might compromise Active Critical Data. • Gen3+ can save and validate critical data through use of digest hashes prior to using that critical data, and Gen3+ can initiate a recovery of the critical data if corruption is detected. |
| Recovery of Mutable Code (Section 4.4.1) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+'s ESC implements the recovery capability. • A successful attack on the platform firmware will not impact Gen3+'s RTRec. The RTRec is maintained in a private flash area inaccessible to the system software that might compromise the platform firmware. • Gen3+'s RTRec has access to a locally stored copy of the platform's UEFI image in its private flash area, which is inaccessible to (protected from) system software. • Gen3+ can update the locally stored authentic UEFI image in its private flash area through an Authenticated Update mechanism. |
| Recovery of Critical Data (Section 4.4.2) | Meets all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+'s ESC implements the recovery capability. • A successful attack on Active Critical Data will not impact Gen3+'s RTRec. The RTRec is maintained in a private flash area inaccessible to the system software that might compromise Active Critical Data. • Gen3+ can recover critical data back to factory defaults including per-platform-specific data that is backed up in isolated & protected storage. • Gen3+ can recover non-per-platform-specific defaults from the backup BIOS image stored in isolated and protected storage. • Gen3+ does not use policies included as part of Critical Data to restore critical data. |
| Logging and notification | Exceeds all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+ will notify user of corruption and log the event. • Gen3+'s detection mechanism is capable of logging events when corruption is detected. • Gen3+ will notify user of a recovery event and log the event. • Gen3+'s detection mechanism is capable of logging events when a recovery action has taken place. |
| Policy-based controls | Exceeds all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+'s detection mechanism has policies which control the action taken by the Runtime Detection. |

Table 4 continued

The table below provides a summary of each function described by NIST SP 800-193.

| NIST SP 800-193 | HP Sure Start | |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| Automatic or manual recovery options | Exceeds all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+ Runtime Detection can initiate a recovery process automatically or after notification of detection corruptions to the user. • Gen3+ can automatically perform its recovery operations without user interaction or it may require user approval, dependent on policy setting. • Gen3+ gains approval from the user before replacing the current Critical Data, based on recovery policy setting. • Gen3+ can recover Critical Data back to a last-known good state. • Gen3+ gains approval from the user before replacing the current Critical Data, based on recovery policy setting. |
| Local or remote IT Recovery | Exceeds all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+ can automatically perform its recovery operations without user interaction or may require user approval, dependent on policy setting |
| Rollback prevention | Exceeds all Resiliency Requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen3+ and the UEFI boot block both have controls in place to protect against recovery to an earlier firmware version with security weaknesses. |
| Runtime intrusion detection | Additional Functionality not required in NISTSP800-193 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NIST SP 800-193 is silent on what happens to firmware once it is loaded from nonvolatile storage (flash) into volatile storage (RAM) for execution. Gen3+ provides runtime intrusion detection of UEFI SMM code loaded into SMM RAM. |
| Physical attack detection | Additional Functionality not required in NISTSP800-193 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gen4+ provides protection against physical attacks to the protected backup copy of dynamic critical data. AES encryption is used on a per-component unique key to provide confidentiality of private data. In addition, HMAC integrity measurements provide tamper prevention/detection of those keys. |

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